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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Melvin Haas I1I*
W. Jonathan Martin II'
Alyssa K Peters*
and Patricia-Anne Upson'
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) and decisions interpreting Georgia law from
June 1, 2016 to May 31, 2017, that affect labor and employment
relations for Georgia employers.'

&

*Equity Partner and Macon Office Head in the firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith
Prophete LLP, Macon, Georgia. Emory University (B.A., 1968); University of Alabama
School of Law (J.D., 1971). Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins
Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supps.). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
-Equity Partner in the firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP, Macon,
Georgia. University of Georgia (B.B.A., cum laude, 1991); Mercer University School of Law
(J.D., magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994); Administrative
Editor (1993-1994). Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (John E. Higgins Jr. et
al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supps.). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*-Partner in the firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP, Macon, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.A., 2004); Georgia State University School of Law (J.D., 2008).
Member, Georgia State Law Review (2006-2008). Contributing Editor, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supps.). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
""Associate in the Firm of Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon,
Georgia. Mercer University (B.B.A., cum laude, 2013); Mercer University, School of Law
(J.D., cum laude, 2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014-2016); Member, State Bar of
Georgia. The Authors would like to thank Sheryle Dickens for her hard work on the
Article.
1. For analysis of labor and employment law during the prior survey period, see
W. Melvin Haas III, et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 68
MERCER L. REV. 151 (2016). Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a
multitude of reference sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law.
See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 6th ed. 2016);
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II. RECENT LEGISLATION-SENATE BILL 201: GEORGIA'S SICK LEAVE LAW

On May 8, 2017, Georgia joined the recent national trend when
Governor Nathan Deal signed legislation that provides paid sick leave to
Georgia employees effective July 1, 2017.2 O.C.G.A. § 34-1-103 requires
employers who meet specific criteria to allow employees to use available
sick leave to care for immediate family members. 4 Under the new statute,
"immediate family members" is defined as "an employee's child, spouse,
grandchild, grandparent, or parent or any dependents as shown on the
employee's most recent tax return."5 This law only applies to employers
who have twenty-five or more employees, 6 do not provide an "employee
8
stock ownership plan,"7 and already offer or have paid sick leave policies.
The law provides that only employees who work thirty hours per week
9
are eligible for the benefit of paid sick leave for family members.
Employees may use a maximum of five days per year on sick leave for
their family members.10
Interestingly, this law does not create a private cause of action for
employees whose employer has failed to comply." Thus, the only means
of enforcement would be through an administrative agency tasked with
enforcing the law. At this time, no state agency has been appointed to
enforce the provisions of this law. Lastly, this law contains a "sunset
provision," which provides that "[t]his Code section shall be repealed in
its entirety on July 1, 2020, unless extended by an Act of the General
Assembly."12

BARBRA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (C. Geoffrey
Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007); W. Jonathan Martin II et al., Labor and Employment,
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 68 MERCER L. REV. 1061 (2017); Daily Labor Report, BLOOMBERG
(last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
BNA, https://www.bna.com/daily-labor-report-p5449/
Accordingly, this Article is not intended to cover the latest developments in federal labor
and employment law. Rather, this Article is intended only to cover legislative and judicial
developments arising under Georgia state law during the survey period.
2. Ga. S. Bill 201, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 203 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10
(2017)); see also Alyssa K. Peters, Georgia'sSB 201 Will Require Sick Leave to be Used for
'Tamily" Reasons, CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE, LLP CLIENT BULLETINS
(May 25, 2017), http://www.constangy.com/communications-727.html.
3. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10 (2017).
4. Id.
5. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(a)(4) (2017).
6. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(a)(3) (2017).
7. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(e) (2017).
8. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(b) (2017).
9. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(a)(1) (2017).
10. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(b).
11. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(d) (2017).
12. O.C.G.A. § 34-1-10(f).
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III. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
A. Employment At-Will
An "at-will employment" relationship is one that may be terminated
13
at any time, with or without cause, by the employer or an employee.
14
While employment at-will in other jurisdictions may be weakening, the
presumption in Georgia remains that all employment is at-will unless a
15
This bar to wrongful
statutory or contractual exception exists.
discharge claims in the at-will employment context "is a fundamental
16
statutory rule governing employer-employee relations in Georgia."

Particularly, O.C.G.A.

§ 34-7-117 provides that "[a]n indefinite hiring" is

at-will employment.18 The definition of an indefinite hiring includes
contract provisions specifying "permanent employment, employment for
19
life, [and] employment until retirement." Further, a contract specifying
20
an annual salary does not create a definite period of employment.
However, if an employment contract does specify a .definite period of
employment, any employment beyond that period becomes employment
21
at-will, subject to discharge without cause.
Regardless of an employer's motive, the general rule in Georgia allows
the discharge of an at-will employee without creating "a cause of action
for wrongful termination." 22 Oral promises between an employer and
employee will not modify the relationship between the two; absent a
23
written contract, an employee's status remains at-will.

13. Employment at Will, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. Haas et al., supranote 1, at 153.
15. W. Melvin Haas III et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 159, 161 (2013). E.g., Wilson v. City of Sardis, 264 Ga. App. 178,
179, 590 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2005).
16. Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 280, 528 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2000).
17. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2017).
18. Id.
19. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 443-44 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 249 Ga. 180, 289 S.E.2d 514 (1982).
20. Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 273, 444 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1994).
21. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 148, 534 S.E.2d
533, 534 (2000).
22. H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1998)); Fink v. Dodd, 286 Ga. App. 363,
365, 649 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2007) (stating 'The employer[ ] with or without cause and
regardless of its motives may discharge the employee without liability" (alteration in
original)).
23. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228-29, 599 S.E.2d 158, 161 (2004); see also City
of St. Marys v. Brinko, 324 Ga. App. 417, 419, 750 S.E.2d 726, 728 (2013) (stating "A party
is not entitled to procedural due process where the interest, which would be impaired by
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In Clemons v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 24 a Delta employee was terminated
after he allegedly mishandled a lost purse and its contents. The employee
filed suit in Fulton County Superior Court against Delta, its CEO, and
individual employees involved in the termination, alleging numerous
claims, including defamation, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, negligent retention, false
promise, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious
interference with contract. The trial court dismissed all of the claims on
various grounds. Notably, the court dismissed the fraudulent
misrepresentation claim for two reasons. First, the employee failed to
allege any facts about how Delta fraudulently misrepresented
information to him. 25 Second, the employee was an at-will employee, and
the court held that "an at-will employee has no cause of action for an oral
promise or fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with his
termination." 26 Thus, the court of appeals held that the dismissal of the
claim was proper. 27
B. Whistleblower Act
Under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA),28 "no public employer
shall retaliate against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a
government agency." 29 To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must
prove four elements: "(1) [The employee] was employed by a public
employer; (2) [The employee] made a protected disclosure or objection; (3)
[The employee] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) There is
some causal relation between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action." 30
In Franklin v. Eaves,31 the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that
there was a question of fact whether the plaintiff timely filed her
whistleblower retaliation claim, reversing the grant of summary
governmental action does not involve that party's protected interest in life, liberty, or
property").
24. 338 Ga. App. 844, 790 S.E.2d 814 (2016).
25. Id. at 847-48, 790 S.E.2d at 817-18.
26. Id. at 848, 790 S.E.2d at 817.
27. Id. at 848, 790 S.E.2d at 818.
28. Ga. H.R. Bill 49, Reg. Sess., 1993 Ga. Laws 563 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 45-1-4 (2017)); see also Colon v. Fulton Cty., 294 Ga. 93, 93, 751 S.E.2d 307, 308 (2013).
29. O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2) (2017).
30. Albers v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 330 Ga. App. 58, 61, 766 S.E.2d
520, 523 (2014); see Forrester v. Ga. Dep't of Human Servs., 308 Ga. App. 716, 722, 708
S.E.2d 660, 666 (2011).
31. 337 Ga. App. 292, 767 S.E.2d 265 (2016).
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judgment. 32 Based on the facts, the court decided that there was a
genuine issue of material fact when the employee learned that certain
work duties were taken away from her. 33 Dedrain E. Franklin had

worked with the health department since 2007, and in 2011, she became
the financial systems coordinator. The new position required Franklin to
handle confidential medical information from patients and payment
information. Franklin's concern was prompted after she was moved from
a private office to a cubicle. This new location would "expose providers'
and patients' protected health information to the general public in
violation of the law." 34 She explained her concerns to her supervisor and
subsequently filed a written grievance pertaining to the issue. Her
grievance was denied, but the health department was required to provide
employees with an office who handled this sensitive information. 35
After her complaint and grievance, Franklin's job duties pertaining to
the handling of patient information and credit card processing were
assigned to other employees. Franklin claimed that she was not made
aware these duties were taken away from her until mid-October of 2012.
After numerous other actions that Franklin felt were retaliatory, she
filed a lawsuit under the GWA for retaliation.36
The trial court held Franklin's claims were time-barred because the
statute of limitations under the GWA is either "within one year after
discovering the retaliation or within three years after the retaliation,
whichever is earlier."37 On appeal, the county argued that the first
instance of alleged retaliation occurred outside of the one-year statute of
limitations. However, Franklin's contention was that she was not aware
of the retaliatory actions within the one-year statute of limitations. 38
Additionally, the court pointed out that Franklin claimed multiple acts
of retaliation, many of which fell squarely within the one-year statute of
limitations. 39 Accordingly, the court of appeals held there was a question
of fact when Franklin was aware that she had been retaliated against;
therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate. 40

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

292, 767 S.E.2d at 267.
299, 767 S.E.2d at 270.
295-96, 767 S.E.2d at 268-69.
295, 767 S.E.2d at 269.
295-96, 767 S.E.2d at 269.
297, 767 S.E.2d at 270 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5)).
300, 767 S.E.2d at 271-72.
300, 767 S.E.2d at 272.
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In West v. City of Albany, 41 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed a
certified question from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia. 42 The question stated, "Is a plaintiff required to
provide a municipal corporation with ante litem notice pursuant to
OCGA § 36-33-5 in order to pursue a claim against it for money damages
under the [GWA]?"43 Serless West, a former employee of the city of
Albany, brought claims under the GWA seeking monetary and equitable
relief.4 4 The supreme court answered in the negative that pre-suit notice

is not required in a claim against the city for retaliation under the
GWA.45
In reaching its answer, the court analyzed both the language of the
municipal ante litem notice statute and the GWA.46 The court concluded
the municipal ante litem statute requires notice where the suit brought
against the municipality is for monetary damages stemming from
negligence. 47 The GWA requires no pre-suit notice to claim retaliatory
discharge, and this claim was not for negligence. 48 The court held the
Georgia General Assembly's use of limiting language in the types of
claims that required the notice was conscious. 49 Following notions of
statutory construction, the court concluded the statute's plain language
demonstrates that it applies only to damages caused by negligence, not
intentional acts, breach of contract, or, like in this case, retaliatory
discharge.O Thus, the court answered that in a claim of retaliation under
the GWA against a municipality, no ante litem notice is required.5 1
In Riggins v. City of Atlanta,52 the Georgia Court of Appeals applied
the precedent set in West,5 3 discussed supra, reversing the superior

court's determination that the plaintiff failed to provide ante litem
notice.54

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

300 Ga. 743, 797 S.E.2d 809 (2017).
Id. at 743, 797 S.E.2d at 810.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 748, 797 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. at 747-48, 797 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Id.
Id. at 748, 797 S.E.2d at 813-14.
Id. at 747-48, 797 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. at 747-48, 797 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Id. at 749, 797 S.E.2d at 814.
340 Ga. App. 895, 798 S.E.2d 730 (2017).
West, 300 Ga. App. at 743, 797 S.E.2d at 809.
Riggins, 340 Ga. App. at 895, 798 S.E.2d at 730.
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C. Interpretationof Employment Contract
In Cobb Beauty College, Inc. v. Scamihorn,5 5 a former director was
terminated in the first year of his contract after the school stated that "it
did not intend to renew his contract."5 6 The Georgia Court of Appeals held
that his employment agreement created an initial three-year term before
the school had the option of not renewing the agreement.5 7 Randall
Scamihorn, former director of Cobb Beauty College (CBC), entered into
an employment agreement on May 11, 2010. The agreement stated, in
part, "This Agreement shall remain in effect for 3 years from the effective
date, renewed automatically on a year-to-year basis."5

8

Nine months into

his contract, the former director was informed that CBC did not intend
to renew his contract, and he was given sixty days of severance pay (to
satisfy the sixty-day notice period). The trial court found the employment
agreement set forth an initial term of three years and that the option not
to renew did not arise until sixty days prior to the expiration of those
three years.5 9 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court's conclusion concerning the initial term of the agreement.6 0
However, the court overturned the superior court's decision concerning
whether there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged
termination for cause.6 1 The employment agreement allowed for
termination upon the occurrence of certain events, and CBC raised a
number of factual disputes, both by affidavit and the pleadings, to
whether it . had cause to terminate Scamihorn. 62 Thus, summary
judgment was not proper where there was a genuine issue of material
fact on this claim. 63
D. Other Employment Contracts
In Argo v. G-Tec Services, LLC, 64 the Georgia Court of Appeals
determined that since an employee made no sales during the length of
his employment, he was not entitled to commission under the terms of
his employment agreement. 65 James Argo and G-Tec entered into an
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

339 Ga. App. 751, 792 S.E.2d 769 (2016).
Id. at 751, 792 S.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 754, 792 S.E.2d at 772.
Id. at 752, 792 S.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 753, 792 S.E.2d at 771.
Id. at 751, 792 S.E.2d at 770.
Id.
Id. at 756, 792 S.E.2d at 769.
Id.
338 Ga. App. 608, 791 S.E.2d 193 (2016).
Id. at 610, 791 S.E.2d at 195.
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Employment Compensation Agreement, which allowed for Argo to
receive commission on sales made by him equal to 2% of the company's
gross sales. However, on December 11, 2013, G-Tec notified Argo that he
would be terminated and at the time of his termination, Argo had not
made any sales. After his termination, Argo filed suit alleging G-Tec
breached the terms of the Employment Agreement by failing to pay him
commissions during his term of employment. Argo argued that he was
not an at-will employee and thus. he was not terminable prior to the
termination of his contract. 66 However, the court concluded the
employment agreement was terminable at will since the agreement
contained clear language stating that the "Company shall have the right
to terminate this Agreement at any time during the Term for any or no
reason."6 7 Since it was terminable at will and Argo made no sales during
his employment, summary judgment was proper on all claims. 66
IV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR: SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts of employees that
are committed within the scope of their employment. 69 To hold an
employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the following two
elements must be established: (1) the employee was acting in furtherance
of the employer's business; and (2) the employee was acting within the
scope of the employer's business. 70
In CorrugatedReplacements, Inc. v. Johnson,71 the Georgia Court of
Appeals overturned the trial court's decision to deny summary judgment
to the defendants. 72 Jacob Lee, son of the owner of Corrugated
Replacements, was driving under the influence when he struck a van,
killing a passenger and severely injuring others. Lee worked odd jobs for
Corrugated, but the truck he was driving at the time of the accident was
not used for his employment. Thus, the Johnson parents sued Robert Lee,
Jacob Lee's father, and Corrugated Replacements. 73
The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.7 4 However, the court of appeals held that Corrugated was
66. Id. at 608, 791 S.E.2d at 194.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 610-11, 791 S.E.2d at 195-96.
Id. at 611, 791 S.E.2d at 196.
CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS§ 7:2 (2016-2017 ed.).
Id.
340 Ga. App. 364, 797 S.E.2d 238 (2017).
Id. at 365, 797 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 364-65, 797 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 365, 797 S.E.2d at 240.
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In addressing the

respondeat superior claim, the court held that Jacob Lee was not acting
within the course and scope of his employment, but rather he was
participating in personal activities.76 Thus, Corrugated was entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.7 7 The negligent entrustment claim
failed because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that either of the
owners of Corrugated had knowledge of Jacob's propensity to drink or
use drugs, and thus would have been on notice of his actions.78
V. BUSINESS TORTS

A. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision
Under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20,79 "The employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency." 80 The Georgia Court of Appeals held that
this statute imposes a duty on the employer to "warn other employees of
dangers incident to employment that 'the employer knows or ought to
know but which are unknown to the employee."' 8 ' To sustain an action
for negligent hiring, the plaintiff must prove the employer hired an
employee whom "the employer knew or should have known posed a risk
of harm to others where it [was] reasonably foreseeable from the
employee's 'tendencies' or propensities that the employee could cause the
type of harm sustained by the plaintiff." 82 Typically, "the determination
of whether an employer used ordinary care in hiring an employee is a
jury issue," 8 3 and is only a question of law "where the evidence is plain,
palpable and undisputable. 84
In Barnes v. Smith, 86 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a sole
shareholder could not be held personally liable for alleged negligent
training of corporate employees and for negligent supervision of a

75. Id.
76. Id. at 367, 797 S.E.2d at 241.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 366, 797 S.E.2d at 241.
79. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2017).
80. Id.
81. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2017)).
82. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606
(2004).
83. Tecumseh, 250 Ga. App. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912.
84. Munroe, 277 Ga. at 864, 596 S.E.2d at 607.
85. 339 Ga. App. 607, 794 S.E.2d 262 (2016).
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bartender.86 Deena Barnes filed suit against DNL Enterprises, Inc. and
its sole shareholder Richard Smith for negligent training and supervision
after being injured in a car accident by an intoxicated customer of Hank
& Jerry's Tavern, a bar owned by DNL. Smith was granted summary
judgment at the trial court level when the court held there was no basis
for piercing the corporate veil to hold Smith personally liable or that
Smith should have known that his bar supervisor needed additional
supervision.87 "For an employer to be held liable for negligent
supervision, there must be sufficient evidence to establish that the
employer reasonably knew or should have known of an employee's
tendencies to engage in certain behavior relevant to the injuries allegedly
88
incurred by the plaintiff."

In negligent supervision cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to
point to specific evidence in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment. 89 While the bartender admitted that she knew the patron
should not be driving, and she did make attempts to stop him, Barnes
failed to present evidence that Smith knew the bartender had this
propensity or that she had done this in the past. Additionally, Barnes
failed to present any evidence that Smith was personally involved in the
commission of the tort, which would serve as a basis for piercing the
corporate veil.90 Thus, the grant of summary judgment on all claims was
affirmed.9 1
In Lucas v. Beckman Coulter, Inc.,92 the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that the employer was not liable when its employee accidently discharged
a firearm injuring the plaintiff. 93 Jeremy Wilson, a field service engineer
for Beckman Coulter, Inc. (BCI), accidently discharged his firearm while
on a service call for his employer. Claude Lucas, an employee at the job
site Wilson was servicing, sustained injuries -to his abdomen when
Wilson's firearm was discharged. Wilson was terminated following this
incident for violating his employer's policy against transporting firearms
in a company vehicle. Subsequently, Lucas filed suit against Wilson and
94
BCI under theories of respondeatsuperior and negligent supervision.
86. Id. at 609-10, 794 S.E.2d at 263-64.
87. Id. at 607-08, 794 S.E.2d at 262-63.
88. Id. at 609-10, 794 S.E.2d at 263-64 (quoting Novare Grp. v. Sarif, 290 Ga. 186,
190-91, 718 S.E.2d 304, 309 (2011)).
89. Id. at 610, 794 S.E.2d at 264.
90. Id. at 608-09, 794 S.E.2d at 263-64.
91. Id. at 608, 794 S.E.2d at 263.
92. 339 Ga. App. 73, 793 S.E.2d 119 (2016), cert. granted, No. 817C0541, 2017 Ga.
LEXIS 417 (2017).
93. Id. at 77, 793 S.E.2d at 121.
94. Id. at 74-75, 793 S.E.2d at 119-20.
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O.C.G.A. § 16-11-13595 allows for immunity to any employer from civil
and criminal actions where an employee transports, stores, possesses, or
uses a firearm and causes injury or commits a crime.96 Pursuant to this
code section, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of BCI
on all claims.9 7 On appeal, the court agreed, holding that the plain
language of the statute afforded the employer immunity considering the
injuries sustained and the subsequent civil action arose out of Wilson's
possession and use of the firearm.98 Additionally, there was no criminal
act by Wilson or BCI.99 There was no dispute that as a matter of law the
plain language of the statute provides immunity to BCI, and summary
judgment was appropriate. 100
B. Personal Torts
In Fuller v. McCormick,10 1 the plaintiff filed suit for a number of
claims, including negligence, negligence per se, failure to train, failure to
supervise, failure to maintain, and vicarious liability after he suffered
injuries from a falling rock from his Bobcat tractor. 102 The court of
appeals reversed the trial court and granted summary judgment for the
defendants after concluding that the plaintiff-employee assumed the risk
of injury as a matter of law. 103 William McCormick was an employee at
Full Stride Farm when he suffered injury from a rock falling out of a
Bobcat onto his knee. 104 The injury resulted from his intentionally
parking "the Bobcat on a sloped surface, overload[ing] the bucket with
rocks, and then fully extended the Bobcat's arm to dump the rocks."105
While McCormick was never formally trained to operate the Bobcat,
McCormick used the Bobcat without injury for thirteen years. 106
In response to McCormick's claims, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment based on the argument that the plaintiff assumed
the risk of injury when he was handling the Bobcat in that manner.107

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-135 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-135(e) (2017).
Lucas, 339 Ga. App. at 75, 793 S.E.2d at 120.
Id. at 77, 793 S.E.2d at 121.
Id.
Id. at 78, 793 S.E.2d at 122-23.
340 Ga. App. 636, 798 S.E.2d 280 (2017).
Id. at 636, 798 S.E.2d at 281.
Id.
Id. at 637, 798 S.E.2d at 281.
Id. at 636, 798 S.E.2d at 281.
Id. at 637, 798 S.E.2d at 281.
Id.
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"Under Georgia law, assumption of the risk provides a complete defense
to liability and bars recovery where the 'plaintiff himself is negligent in
such a way that his own negligence is the sole proximate cause' of his
injury."108 The defendants bear the initial burden of proof to come
forward with evidence sufficient to establish "that the plaintiff (1) had
actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks
associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to those
risks."1 09 The defendant proved this by showing that McCormick had
actual knowledge of the open and obvious danger of his conduct,
including his testimony that "something could happen," the lack of front
cage protection, and the warning signs that cautioned against his actions.
McCormick stated that he was concerned for his safety, which shows that
he understood and appreciated the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself
to the risks involved with his actions. 110
C. Tortious Interference with Employment Contract
In Tolson Firm, LLC v. Sistrunk,111 an associate attorney took eight
cases with her when she resigned her employment with Sistrunk at the
Cochran Firm, and those eight cases subsequently settled for
approximately three million dollars, cumulatively. In the suit against
Tolson, the Cochran Firm claimed breach of duty of loyalty and breach of
fiduciary duty, among other things. 112 The trial court denied summary
judgment on those claims and the court of appeals affirmed the denial. 113
A claim for breach of loyalty can only stand against an at-will employee
where the employee owes a fiduciary duty to the employer. 114 A fiduciary
relationship is created where "one party is so situated as to exercise a
controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or
where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires
the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners,
principal and agent, etc."11 5 The Cochran Firm presented evidence that
Tolson was a fiduciary based on the fact that she was the primary contact
on many cases, brought in her own cases, and had discretion to make

108. Id. at 638, 798 S.E.2d at 282 (quoting Sapp v. Effingham Cty Bd. of Educ., 200 Ga.
App. 695, 696, 409 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1991)).
109. Id. (quoting Vaughn v. Pleasent, 266 Ga. 862, 864, 471 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1996)).
110. Id. at 639-40, 798 S.E.2d at 282-83.
111. 338 Ga. App. 25, 789 S.E.2d 265 (2016).
112. Id. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at 267.
113. Id. at 25, 789 S.E.2d at 267-68.
114. Id. at 26, 789 S.E.2d at 268.
115. Id. at 26-27, 789 S.E.2d at 268 (quoting Wright v. Apartment Inv. & Mgmt. Co.,
315 Ga. App. 587, 592, 726 S.E.2d 779, 785 (2012)).
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decisions for the firm. 116 The court held that this evidence creates a
question of fact whether there was a fiduciary relationship and, thus, a
duty of loyalty owed by Tolson." 7
If Tolson is in fact an agent with a fiduciary duty, she "cannot engage
in acts in direct competition with the employer's business before the
employment relationship ends ... or solicit customers for a rival business
before the end of [her] employment."1 8 Specifically for an attorney,
Absent an agreement with the firm providing a more permissive rule,
a lawyer leaving a law firm may solicit firm clients:
(a) prior to leaving the firm:
(i) only with respect to firm clients on whose matters the lawyer is
actively and substantially working; and
(ii) only after the lawyer has adequately and timely informed the
firm of the lawyer's intent to contact firm clients for that purpose; and
(b) after ceasing employment in the firm, to the same extent as any
other nonfirm lawyer." 9

There was some conflicting testimony at the trial court level when
Tolson began soliciting her clients to move with her.1 20 Thus, with a
genuine issue of material fact on both issues, the court of appeals held
that summary judgment was not proper for these claims.1 2 1
In Rowell v. Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, Inc.,1 22 the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that the hospital and its vice president of medical
affairs, Doug Patten, were not liable for tortious interference with the
anesthesiologist's employment contract.1 23 Esperanza Rowell had a
verbal agreement with SOWEGA Anesthesia, LLC to work at the
hospital as an anesthesiologist on nights and weekends. Patten became
concerned about Rowell's patient care and contacted SOWEGA to inform

116. Id. at 27, 789 S.E.2d at 268.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 27, 789 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting Sitton v. Print Direction, 312 Ga. App. 365,
372-73, 718 S.E.2d 532, 539 (2011)).
119. Id. at 28, 789 S.E.2d at 269 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAWS, THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 9(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)).
120. Id. at 29, 789 S.E.2d at 270.
121. Id.
122. 338 Ga. App. 603, 791 S.E.2d 183 (2016).
123. Id. at 605, 791 S.E.2d at 185.
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it that Rowell should not return to work at the hospital and, if she did,
her privileges would be suspended. 124
The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the
defendants, the hospital, and Patten, finding there was no tortious
interference because there was no evidence of malice from the hospital or
Patten. 125 In a tortious interference with contract claim, the plaintiff
must prove,
(1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the defendant without
privilege; (2) the defendant acted purposely and with malice with the
intent to injure; (3) the defendant induced a breach of contractual
obligation or cause a party or third party to discontinue or fail to enter
into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the
defendant's tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the
plaintiff. 126

The plaintiff claimed on appeal that a genuine question of fact existed
whether the hospital and Patten acted with malice because Patten
contacted SOWEGA instead of Rowell. 127 In its analysis, the court of
appeals rejected the plaintiffs argument concerning malice, concluding
that guesses or speculation do not create a question of fact. 128
Additionally, Patten did not know Rowell when these events occurred,
and he simply chose to follow hospital procedures by contacting her
supervisor to inform her of Rowell's choices. The plaintiff chose not to
return to the hospital.129 On appeal, the court held summary judgment
was proper because the plaintiff did not produce evidence that the
hospital or Patten acted with malice in their actions against her. 130
VI. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

In 2011, the law in Georgia on restrictive covenants underwent major
changes when the Georgia General Assembly passed House Bill 30 after
voters approved a constitutional amendment. 131 Prior to the amendment
and subsequent legislation, the courts would only allow non-compete

124.
125.
126.
(2002)).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
8-50-59

Id. at 603-04, 791 S.E.2d at 186.
Id. at 604, 791 S.E.2d at 185.
Id. (quoting Culpepper v. Thompson, 254 Ga. App. 569, 571, 562 S.E.2d 837, 840
Id.
Id. at 605, 791 S.E.2d at 185.
Id.
Id. at 607, 791 S.E.2d at 186.
Ga. H.R. Bill 30, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 99 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-2, 13(2017)); see also GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3).
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agreements that merely placed a partial restraint on trade, rather than
a general restraint. 132 As a result, any covenant that placed a general
restraint was found to be void and, notwithstanding a severability clause,
would void the entire agreement. 133 Under the amendment, courts focus
their analysis on whether a covenant restricts future employment in a
reasonable manner. 134 The amendment also allows the courts to blue
pencil agreements made after 2011 to avoid the invalidation of the entire
agreement. 135 However, agreements made before the approval of the
amendment are not subject to blue-penciling. 136 These agreements will be
held valid as a partial restraint only when the agreement is specific and
reasonable in regard to duration, geographic restriction, and scope of the
activities prohibited. 137

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia,
applying Georgia state law, decided a case of first impression concerning
Georgia's new amendment and statute. In LifeBrite Laboratories,LLC v.
Cooksey, 138 the district court held that the term "modify" in Georgia's
Restrictive Covenant Act1 39 only allows the court to strike offending
restrictions and narrow terms that might be overbroad. 14 0 This limits the
court to modifying existing terms instead of adding in terms that did not
previously exist in the covenant. 141 Nina Cooksey was an employee of
LifeBrite responsible for selling toxicology tests to doctors and medical
practices. At the beginning of her employment, Cooksey signed an
employment agreement that contained a non-compete clause. The clause
stated that Cooksey was prohibited from working for any competing lab
testing facility while she was employed and for one year thereafter. The
covenant did not contain a geographic limitation.142 The court held that
132. See O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a) (2010 & Supp. 2014).
133. Vulcan Steel Structures, Inc. v. McCarty, 329 Ga. App. 220, 224, 764 S.E.2d 458,
462 (2014).
134. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 (2017). For a more
in-depth legislative and political history of the restrictive covenant constitutional
amendment, see W. Melvin Haas III, et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REV. 151, 182-88 (2012).
135. See Vulcan Steel Structures, Inc., 329 Ga. App. at 220, 764 S.E.2d at 459.
136. Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 30, 706 S.E.2d 660, 66364 (2011); Lapolla Indus., Inc. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256, 265-66, 750 S.E.2d 467, 475
(2013).
137. Cox, 308 Ga. App. at 31, 706 S.E.2d at 664; see also W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn
Div. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464, 465, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992).
138. No. 1:15-CV-4309-Twt, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181823 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2016).
139. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50.
140. LifeBrite, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181823, at *19.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *2-4.
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the lack of geographic restriction made the covenant unenforceable and
this covenant could not be reformed through blue-penciling.1 43
In its analysis of blue-penciling standards, the court relied on Georgia
common law, as it pertains to sale of business non-competition
covenants.1 44 Unlike covenants in the employment context, where overly
broad restrictions would deem the whole covenant unenforceable, sale of
business covenants not to compete were subject to blue-penciling.1 45 In
those situations if a court deemed a restriction too broad, it would modify
the restriction by only reforming the offending language-not adding
restrictions entirely.14 6 The court indicated that nothing in the Georgia
Restrictive Covenant Act revised the manner in which the blue pencil
may be used, it only allowed for more situations where it could be used.1 47
VI. CONCLUSION

As this Article demonstrates, the issues arising under Georgia law are
becoming progressively more challenging each year with the growing
overlap between state and federal issues, as well as growing state
regulations. Regardless of whether a practitioner specializes in state,
federal, administrative, or other matters pertaining to labor and
employment, it is important to recognize and stay abreast of the everevolving trends, policies, cases, and state and federal guidelines.
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Id. at *14.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *17-18.
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